Abstract:

In this article we address the ongoing debate on the democratic quality and legitimacy of the European Union. We focus on the recent argument that, at least in the foreseeable future, the EU will be unable to develop an input-oriented legitimization because of the lack of a 'thick' collective identity and therefore should be satisfied with an output-oriented legitimization. We raise several questions with regard to this debate. First, we address the empirical implications of the argument. Output-oriented legitimization assumes both a common perception across the EU of the most important problems to be solved and a common understanding that these problems should be solved at the European level. Secondly, we take issue with the argument that a well-developed democratic political system at European level requires a thick collective identity. The concept of a 'demos' is not identical to the concept of a 'people' (Volk) in a sociological sense. Also, we express our doubts about the democratic quality of a democracy based solely on government for the people. We argue that once political decisions are taken at European level there is every reason to apply the same normative democratic principles to the EU that are applicable to its member states. In modern politics, democracy almost by definition means representative democracy, and representative democracy assumes a competitive party system. We therefore address the question to what extent a competitive party system at the European level would be feasible.

Keywords:

  • democratic deficit

  • European Union

  • legitimacy

  • party manifestos

Introduction

I t is clear what European citizens want. They want the Union to address their concerns and help solve their problems. They want the European Union to do what it was created to do: to take on, effectively and democratically, those cross-border problems which the nation-states of Europe are unable to deal with on their own. No more, no less." This is how Gijs de Vries, the Dutch representative to the European convention started a mid-term assessment of the European convention (De Vries 2003: 13). The statement contains a clear message that can be found both in recent policy documents of the European Union (EU) and in the academic literature. The core of the message is: let us not endlessly talk about the political institutions and procedures of the new Europe, but let the Union respond to the problems which are a real concern to the people. That is also the most effective way for the EU to become a legitimate level of government. A perfect example of a EU policy document preaching this message is the following:

"

The image of a democratic and globally engaged Europe admirably matches citizens' wishes. There have been frequent public calls for a greater EU role in justice and security, action against cross-border crime, control of migration flows and reception of asylum seekers and refugees from far-flung war zones. Citizens also want results in the fields of employment and combating poverty and social exclusion, as well as in the field of economic and social cohesion. They want a common approach on environmental pollution, climate change and food safety, in short, all transnational issues that they instinctively sense can only be tackled by working together. Just as they also want to see Europe more involved in foreign affairs, security and defence, in other words, greater and better coordinated action to deal with trouble spots in and around Europe and in the rest of the world." [...] "What they expect is more results, better responses to practical issues and not a European super state or European institutions inveigling their way into every nook and cranny of life. (Laeken declaration on The Future of the European Union; 15 December 2001)

The Council's call for 'more results, better responses to practical issues' reflects a school of thought that considers the performance or the 'output' of the EU as the most important, if not the only legitimizing princi-

ple of the EU. This view has been developed most consistently by Scharpf (1999), who has been pleading for an output-oriented rather than an input-oriented legitimization of EU policies. In terms of Lincoln's famous description of the main elements of democracy, input-oriented legitimization refers to government by the people, whereas output-oriented legitimization refers to government for the people. The basis of legitimacy of these different kinds or rather different aspects of democracy is different. From the perspective of input-oriented legitimacy, political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the 'will of the people', that is if they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community. From the perspective of output-oriented legitimacy, political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question (Scharpf 1999: 6).

Scharpf argues that the plausibility of what he calls the participatory rhetoric suffers as the distance between the persons directly affected and their representatives increases. Although the rhetoric of input-oriented democracy is in terms of the will of the people, for most practical purposes decisions are taken by majority rule. The justification of majority rule must be considered as the crucial problem of input-oriented theories of democratic legitimatization. Majority rule will only be accepted in polities with a 'thick' collective identity, i.e. in polities based on pre- existing commonalities of history, language, culture, and ethnicity. This is not the case with regard to the Union:

Given the historical, linguistic, cultural, ethnic and institutional diversity of its member states, there is no question that the Union is very far from having achieved the 'thick' collective identity that we have come to take for granted in national democracies - and in its absence, institutional reforms will not greatly increase the input-oriented legitimacy of decisions taken by majority rule. (Scharpf 1999: 9)

According to this view the input perspective derives its democratic legitimacy from a pre-existing collective identity. As such a collective identity does not exist at the level of the Union, input-oriented legitimacy is out of reach for the EU for the foreseeable future. Referring to a famous verdict of the German constitutional court (see below), Scharpf (1999: 10) further argues that an original input-oriented legitimization of EU government might eventually evolve because processes of European-wide

political communication and opinion formation would be facilitated by European political parties, European associations, and European media. However, as long as this is no more than a vision of the future, a more modest form of legitimization must have to uphold the Union, i.e. an output-oriented legitimization brought about by government for the people.

Government for the people derives its legitimacy from its capacity to tackle problems requiring collective solutions. Identifying collective solutions still presupposes the existence of an identifiable constituency, but what is required is no more than the perception of a range of common interests that is sufficiently broad and stable to justify institutional arrangements for collective action. Output-oriented legitimacy is thus interest-based rather than identity-based (Scharpf 1999: 11-12).

In this contribution we take the distinction between input-oriented and output-oriented legitimacy as a point of departure. In the next section we derive some further empirical requirements from the notion of output legitimacy that in our view has to be met if the concept is to be given any significance in the real world of European politics. In the second part of the paper, we take issue from a normative perspective with the idea of output-oriented legitimacy as the only basis of legitimacy for EU politics. Next, from an empirical point of view we examine the extent to which a more input-oriented basis of legitimacy of European politics is really out of reach.

Output-oriented legitimacy

According to Scharpf, output-oriented legitimacy requires "... no more than the perception of a range of common interests that is sufficiently broad and stable to justify institutional arrangements for collective action" (Scharpf 1999: 12). The first condition is obviously the perception of a range of common interests. Common in this context can hardly mean anything other than common across the member countries of the EU. If the Italians were to perceive totally different problems to be solved than for example the British, there would be no common interest in the sense of a common perception of problems that would justify collective action. The second condition refers to the need "to justify institutional arrangements for collective action". Justified in whose eyes? As we are talking about legitimization of EU politics, this can only be the people. In

this section we therefore address two empirical questions. (1) Is there a common perception across the EU of important problems to be solved? and (2) Is there a common understanding that these problems should be solved at the European level?

European citizens' perceptions of the most important problems to be solved can be drawn from the series of mass surveys of the European Election Study 1999.1 Representative telephone surveys were conducted in each of the then 15 member countries of the Union shortly after the 1999 election to the European Parliament. Right at the beginning of the survey, respondents were asked what in their eyes the most important political problem was, at which level of government the main responsibility for handling this problem at the moment was located, and at which level it in their view should be dealt with.2

One in two European citizens mentioned unemployment as the most important problem. All other issues are far behind. Among the other, that is less pressing, problems, law and order is the most prominent, followed by general economic issues. Welfare state topics, such as healthcare and pensions (and a bit further down education) come next, followed by immigration and taxation. It serves no purpose to enumerate all the issues mentioned by the respondents of the EES'99 surveys (see last column Table 1).

What is more important for our purpose is the extent to which people across Europe have a common understanding of what the major problems in society are. The answer to that question is mixed. The concern about unemployment overshadows any other problem when we look at Europe as a whole and to most of the member states. In 6 countries more than 40 percent of respondents mention unemployment as the most important problem, whereas in another 5 countries it is the most frequently mentioned problem. In four countries it is not.3 But even in these countries, with the possible exception of Portugal (healthcare), there is not one single national concern seriously competing with the major concern in Europe. Therefore the least one can say is that in none of the member states is the political agenda dominated by a single or a few pressing concerns that are incompatible with what other people in Europe are concerned with.

Table 1. Citizens political agenda by EU member-state and EU-wide (figures are percen- tages)

Belg

Denm

Germ Gree

Spai

Fran

IRL

Ital

Lux

Neth Port

UK

FIN

Swed Aust

EU

Unemployment

17

5

57

32

66

68

12

27

4

18

18

71

41

50

46

Taxation

3

2

5

0

0

2

2

0

1

1

2

4

2

2

6

1

0

0

3

1

5

2

1

1

Other economic

6

14

8

19

3

3

14

9

14

8

11

11

19

5

8

All economic

26

27

71

51

69

73

31

36

19

27

35

84

68

58

58

Healthcare

2

8

1

9

2

1

8

4

39

7

2

7

0

4

Pensions

0

4

7

1

1

1

18

0

9

0

1

1

3

Education

0

1

1

5

1

1

1

18

1

6

6

4

1

2

Other welfare

1

0

2

0

0

7

8

1

2

2

1

All welfare

3

13

9

17

4

3

16

36

13

55

15

2

12

4

10

Law and order

16

1

1

5

4

7

3

14

2

9

1

1

5

EU

18

0

1

0

2

3

1

10

4

4

5

3

Peace and war

1

2

2

0

0

12

0

3

1

1

1

2

Kosovo

0

3

4

0

0

1

1

2

0

1

2

Foreign and

0

4

0

8

0

3

1

0

14

1

Defense

Other political

10

8

4

6

8

3

15

9

8

4

6

4

4

8

5

All political

26

35

11

22

12

12

33

9

27

6

31

10

10

29

17

Drugs

1

2

7

12

2

10

3

1

1

0

2

Norms and values

2

2

2

1

1

3

3

4

1

0

2

Migration

4

5

1

1

0

2

1

16

1

0

2

Minorities

3

4

3

1

0

0

3

1

0

4

1

Other social

7

3

2

2

1

6

2

9

5

2

0

2

0

1

3

All social

15

14

8

8

9

9

16

9

29

12

9

3

2

5

10

All environment

25

11

1

3

2

2

1

9

8

0

2

7

3

3

Other

4

1

1

2

0

3

4

1

8

1

1

0

2

Weighted N

334

155

2915

385 1373

1928

122

10

467

355 1784

140

258

268 10494

Table 2. Most important problem: perceived and preferred level of government (figures are percentages) Preferred level of problem solution

Perceived level of problem solution

Region

Nation

Europe

All

Region

10

7

6

23

Nation

10

28

12

50

EU

5

6

16

27

All

25

41

34

100

On the question where people want to allocate the responsibility to solve what they see as the most important problem, we present two pieces of information. First, in Table 2 we have related people's preference for the level of government at which they think this problem should be solved to the level at which they think the main responsibility is allocated at this moment. This gives an indication of people's preference for 'more' or 'less' Europe. In Table 3 we present people's preferred level of government for different problem areas. This gives a clear indication of the extent to which people differentiate between different policy areas. What is evident from Table 2 is that the proportion of EU citizens who wish the EU were in charge of solving their problem is slightly larger (34 percent) than the proportion who believes the EU is already in charge (27 percent). While this is not a dramatic difference, it should be noted that on balance the increase comes from the nation-state. By and large, people have confidence in the problem-solving capacity of the European level of governance and want to increase its competence at the expense of the national level of governance. While these findings do not readily square with the current debate on Euro-scepticism (Taggart and Sczerbiak 2003), they neatly replicate the results of the 1994 European Election Study (see Schmitt and Scheuer 1996, De Winter and Swyngedouw 1999).

The issue agenda of EU citizens is sorted by preferred level of governance in Table 3. What problems do citizens allocate to the European level? Is there a pattern? There are two tendencies to be observed. One has to do with the scope of the problem. People prefer Europe to deal with problems that clearly transcend national borders. This is the case

Table 3. Most important problems and preferred level of problem solution (figures are per- centages)

Preferred level of government

Salience

EU

Nation

Region

Type of

EU-wide

Problem

(row %)

(row %)

(row %)

issue

(column %)

Kosovo

82

14

4

Political

1.7

Peace and war

69

27

4

Political

1.5

Environment

54

31

15

Environment

2.8

Drugs

46

26

28

Social

2.0

Migration

45

45

10

Social

1.8

Minorities

44

38

18

Social

1.6

Other social

38

39

24

Social

2.5

35

50

15

Economic

1.4

Foreign and defense

35

53

12

Political

1.2

Other economic

33

52

15

Economic

7.9

Unemployment

32

36

32

Economic

46.5

Pensions

31

47

21

Welfare

2.6

EU

31

53

16

Political

2.6

Education

28

35

37

Welfare

2.3

Law and order

27

38

36

Political

5.1

Norms and values

26

45

29

Social

1.8

Other political

26

51

23

Political

5.0

Other welfare

26

45

29

Welfare

1.0

Health

20

41

38

Welfare

4.3

Taxation

15

52

33

Economic/welfare

2.3

with international conflicts such as the Kosovo war, and peace and war more generally, but also with protection of the environment, drugs, and migration. Absolute (boldface) or relative majorities (italics) of respondents considering one of these problems as most important want the EU to be in charge. Conversely, majorities of people who consider problems with a clear domestic scope as most important - examples are taxes, pensions, education, and law and order - prefer the nation-state to be responsible (Table 3).

There is an additional tendency borne out by the data, however. It seems that the more important issues are to the individual citizen, i.e. the more important an issue is to one's daily life, the less it tends to be allocated to the EU level of governance. Taxes, healthcare, and other welfare

issues at the bottom of the EU-governance hit-parade seem to confirm this observation. Without any doubt, these are central issues for most EU citizens. Perhaps this is the very reason why they are allocated to the national level of governance by majorities of respondents.

Therefore the answer to our first two research questions is mixed. There is common understanding across Europe of what the major problems in society are. However, this does not necessarily mean that people think 'Europe' is the most appropriate level of government to deal with these problems. On economic and social issues the national state is still the favorite level of government. At the same time there is a remarkable correspondence between the favorite level of government of the people and the more objective characteristics of issue domains. People tend to allocate responsibility to the EU for policy domains that are characterized by endogenous internationalization (Sinnott 1995, De Winter and Swyngedouw 1999). This means that people are probably more knowledgeable about the logic of internationalization than is often assumed.

Beyond output-oriented legitimacy

In this section we come back to the question whether input-oriented legitimacy is at all possible for the EU level of government. Scharpf argues that it is not. First, we take issue with his argument that this form of legitimacy presupposes a common identity; second, we discuss whether output-oriented legitimacy meets the criteria of democratic polity.

It is beyond dispute that the very idea of democracy, and of people's sovereignty, at whatever level, presupposes the existence of a people, a demos. However, what might be a matter of dispute is what 'the people' really means. A basic question here is whether 'the people' is more or less of a legal construct, in the sense of all people who are subject to the jurisdiction of a particular polity, or whether the notion of 'the people' is based on a more sociological or even ethnic concept ('das Volk') that stresses the subjective affiliation of the people with a community as a prerequisite for the constitution of demos as a collective actor.

The view that the pre-existence of a collective identity is the very condition for the establishment of a legitimate democracy has been set out systematically by Graf Kielmansegg (1996). He argues that the concepts

of demos ('Volk'), community ('Gemeinschaft'), and nation are almost identical. Once one accepts this view, it is obvious what the verdict on the feasibility of a European democracy will be. European democracy is then bound to fail because a democratic constitution in itself cannot establish a legitimate European democracy. As long as there is no European Gemeinschaft, every attempt to establish a democratic Europe is bound to fail. Against this background, it is easy enough for Graf Kielmansegg to demonstrate that the EU is far removed from a community with a common identity. The European peoples do not share a common language; they lack memories of a common history that might help to develop a collective identity; and they do not take part in a common 'European' public sphere ('Öffentlichkeit'). There are only national public spheres.

This same philosophy is reflected in the famous decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the compatibility of the Treaty of Maastricht with the German Basic Law (BVerfGE 89, 155 - Maastricht). As no European demos has developed yet, according to the decision, democracy cannot be exclusively grounded at the European level of government (Shaw 1997: 35).

However, the argument that demos and citizenship have to originate in a community with a collective or national identity is highly disputable. This argument presumes a conception of citizenship along the lines of the ius sanguinis, the rights of kinship. Throughout history, however, there has been a competing notion of citizenship that is defined according to the ius solis, whereby citizenship is acquired through permanent residence (under specific conditions) within a certain territory (Brubaker 1992). The latter view allows for the possibility that European citizenship need not be the political projection of a cultural idea of Europe, but can essentially be regarded as a legal construct: 'Citizenship should be the ultimate basis of legitimation for institution-building, not ambiguous cultural identities' (Delanty 1995: 163). This seems to be consistent with the history of many nation-states. The argument that a shared common identity, a demos in the ethno-cultural sense, should precede the constitution of a demos, that is a community of citizens sharing the rights and duties of citizenship, has little ground in history. In many European countries the formation of the state preceded the development of the nation (Fuchs 2000: 230).

While this view explicitly accepts the reciprocal reinforcement of ideas of community and the practice of citizenship, the causal sequence is reversed. Therefore, one may well argue that the constitution of a European democratic polity and the establishment of a European citizenship by the Treaty of Maastricht ('Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union' (Article 8:1)) is a prerequisite of the development of a European identity. To borrow a phrase from O'Leary (1996), European citizenship may be regarded as an 'evolving concept': starting from the free movement of persons, through its legal formalization, to a full-fledged identity.

A second question we should address is how democratic a polity based on an output-oriented legitimacy really is, and whether the criteria of a democratic polity that were developed in the context of the nation-state are applicable to the EU. If we take the idea of output-oriented legitimatization or government for the people literally, in the sense of effectively taking care of the wants, needs, and interests of the people, it is hard to avoid thinking of Schumpeter's famous Philippic against the classic theory of democracy with its ideas of a common good and a will of the people. One of Schumpeter's objections to the classic theory is that it hardly offers a criterion to distinguish democratic from non-democratic governments:

... the classical theory meets with difficulties on that score because both the will and the good of the people may be, and in many historical instances have been, served just as well or better by governments that cannot be described as democratic according to any accepted usage of the term. (Schumpeter 1976: 269-270)

Schumpeter convincingly argues that democracy should therefore be defined primarily as a modus procedendi and defines democracy as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter 1976: 269).

Let us hasten to admit that it would be totally unfair to put Scharpf's concept of an output-oriented system of government on a par with any simplistic idea of government for the people. His concept is far more refined and can better be classified as another version of the liberal or Madisonian theory of democracy, to be distinguished from the populist

theory of democracy (Dahl 1956, Riker 1982). It focuses on the prevention of the abuse of power by a system of checks and balances rather than on giving a say to the people. But even then, Dahl, after a thorough analysis of the Madisonian concept of democracy, concludes that it can hardly be characterized as being democratic at all (Dahl 1956). A fundamental principle of democracy is popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty refers to the question of what it means for the people to rule. Because modern democracy is virtually identical with representative democracy, this aspect of popular sovereignty refers to the electoral authorization of government and stipulates the requirements of represen- tation and accountability (Beetham and Lord 1998: 6). In order to understand what democracy in a specific context means, we need to specify the mechanisms of representation and accountability that are needed within a given polity with a given demos.

Political representation is hardly thinkable without political parties. Ever since Schumpeter (1976) defined democracy in terms of a competition of political leaders for the votes of the people, public contestation or political competition is generally recognized as one of the most essential characteristics of modern democracy (Dahl 1971). Dahl even calls "The system of managing the major political conflicts of a society by allowing one or more opposition parties to compete with the governing parties for votes in elections and in parliament" "one of the greatest and most unexpected social discoveries that man has ever stumbled upon" (Dahl 1966: xvii). Or, as Bingham Powell (1982: 3) puts it: "The competitive electoral context, with several political parties organizing the alternatives that face the voters, is the identifying property of the contemporary democratic process". It is in this respect that the EU is often said to be failing.

But before getting involved in the debate on this possible failure we must first address a preliminary question. The normative principles of democracy outlined above have been developed in the context of the nation-state. It is still a matter of dispute whether they are applicable to the EU. As long as decisions of the EU were taken according to the intergovernmental regime by unanimous vote, it could be maintained that there was no need of a democratic legitimization at the level of the Union because each and every national government was accountable to its national parliament and electorate for the positions it took in the European arena. Binding decisions were thus taken by representatives of the

peoples of Europe rather than of the European people. But ever since the Single European Act opened the possibility for the Council of Ministers to decide by majority vote instead of unanimity, national parliaments have lost part of their power to scrutinize and control the positions taken by their national governments in the European arena. Also, as much as it would be wrong to regard the EU as a state

... the output of European governance is like that of a state, even a superstate: an endless stream of laws in increasingly varied areas of public and private life. They are binding on governments and individuals as part of the law of the land. Indeed, they are a higher law of the land - supreme over conflicting state laws. (Weiler et al. 1995: 4)

The EU is the source of authoritative rules and allocations that impinge directly on citizens, and which require their acknowledgement of them as authoritative and binding (Beetham and Lord 1998: 13).

As a basic principle of democracy, we hold that the democratic process should occur at the same level at which decisions are taken. In other words, if decisions are taken at the European level according to a supranational regime, the demos should be defined at the level of the European people. Once one accepts this argument, it is only a matter of consistency to apply the same normative democratic principles to the EU as to the nation-state. This means that we can distinguish between two pathways of representation. First, there is the pathway via the national parliaments. As long as European decision-making takes place according to the intergovernmental regime, interests and preferences of the people can effectively be represented by national parliaments, to whom national governments are accountable for the role they take in EU decision-making. Once the system of decision-making of the Union shifts into its supranational mode, however, this is no longer the case. National processes of representation and accountability are then no longer able to legitimize and control the EU policy-making process. This is the raison d'être of the European Parliament and of direct elections to the Parliament.

Once one accepts that the contemporary democratic process is indeed identified by the competitive electoral context, with several political parties organizing the alternatives that face the voters (Powell 1982: 3), then this applies to the EU just as well as to any other polity. This principle is

increasingly acknowledged both in political science (e.g. Beetham and Lord 1998, Beetham and Lord 2001) and in politics. The Draft Constitution as proposed by the European Convention formally bases the Union on the principle of representative democracy (art. I-45, 1). Moreover, it properly identifies the two routes of representation: that of citizens via the European Parliament and that of member states via the Council (art. I-45, 2).

In the remaining part of this contribution we focus on the question whether such a competitive electoral context as a major building-stone of an effective system of political representation does exist at the level of the EU and, if not, whether it is at least feasible. The member states of the EU recognize that political parties, i.e. the key players in domestic electoral politics, should also play a central role in the process of European integration: 'Political parties at the European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union' (article 138a of the Treaty on European Union (the so-called Maastricht treaty) which has been retained in the Draft Constitution of the European Convention, art. I-45, 3).

Expressing the will of the citizens of the Union requires a competitive electoral context at the European level. However, it has often been argued that such a context is missing at the European level: there are no 'real' European political parties competing for the votes of a European people. Instead national political parties address a national electorate on the basis of national political issues. Voters base their party choice on considerations of national rather than European politics, if they vote at all. Moreover, according to some observers, political parties fail to organize the alternatives that ought to be decided in European Parliament elections, i.e. alternatives with respect to the development of the EU as such. Even worse, debate on these issues is said to be suppressed by the leadership of major political parties because they are internally divided and risk being split apart if these issues become politicized (e.g. van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). In this perspective, only a restructuring of the European party system - in which parties would organize themselves along a pro-anti European integration dimension - would provide the EU electorate with relevant choice options (e.g. Andeweg 1995).

We will not argue against the first part of these observations. It is

indeed debatable whether a competitive party system at the European level really exists. No doubt it does in an institutional sense. A European party system does exist, both as a system of extra- and intra-parliamentary parties. The traditional European political families - the Socialists, Christian Democrats and Conservatives, Liberals and the Greens - have organized themselves into transnational party federations. They possess all the elements of a transnational party federation: a statute, a common programme, a secretariat, an executive body, a party assembly, a hierarchical leadership structure, the ability to make decisions binding on the member parties, and the aspiration to become a fully fledged European political party (Hix 1996: 308).

Still, the importance of transnational parties in the electoral process seems to range between limited and non-existent. Their most significant role in the European elections is to coordinate the writing-up of transnational party manifestos. Being a compromise between different political traditions in member states, these manifestos are characterized as offering little more than platitudes (Smith 1996: 278). However, this is probably true for every party platform. The same goes for the observation that these manifestos hardly play a role in the elections. National parties adapt them rather than produce an own election program in an increasing number of cases. This could be speaking in favor of these transnational manifestos, but it could at the same time be pointing to a decline in the importance that national parties attribute to European parliamentary elections.

One thing is clear: European elections are still the arena of national political parties. A competitive European party system in the sense that EU parties would compete for votes does not exist. However, being interested in the EU as a developing political system we are inclined to reformulate the question on competitiveness and to see to what extent a competitive political system at the level of the EU is at least feasible (cf. Thomassen and Schmitt 1999, Schmitt and Thomassen 1999).

In order to assess whether a competitive party system at the European level is feasible we first have to clarify what we mean by a competitive party system at the European level and when we would consider such a system feasible. An important question with regard to competitiveness is: competitive on what, i.e. on what kind of issues? As mentioned above, one of the most persistent critical comments on the elections for the

European parliament and in particular on the role of political parties in these elections is that the party system does not offer a relevant choice to the European electorate, relevant being understood as offering different positions on the dimension pro-anti-European integration. We think this criticism is highly disputable. Following Friedrich, not agreement but disagreement is a characteristic of a healthy democracy. However, disagreement can only have a healthy function if it is based on a general agreement on the basic rules of the polity, i.e. on the Constitution (Friedrich 1963). Agreement on the institutional framework of the Union might be considered as an agreement on the basic rules of a European polity and therefore a condition rather than an obstacle to a competitive European party system.

If it is not on issues of European integration, what then should a European competitive party system be based on? As the Union forms the upper layer of a multilevel system of government, it is not necessarily the case that the issues it is faced with are different from those on the agenda of national or subnational governments. The issues may well be the same, but the difference is that they are dealt with on a larger scale. From this perspective, the effectiveness of a European system of political representation does not depend on its ability to politicize the issue of European integration, but rather on its ability to aggregate and integrate national political agendas and the national cleavage structures at the European level (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999).

However, as we argued above, such a system should also be feasible. Feasibility in our vocabulary implies stability in the long term. It can only be stable in the long run when it is legitimate, which implies that majority decisions taken within the context of such a system of political representation are accepted. This leads us back to Scharpf's concern that majority decisions taken in a polity that is not based on a 'thick' collective identity will not be legitimate.

While this concern is realistic, a 'thick' collective identity is not the only possible solution to the problem. Scharpf's concern is similar to the classic notion that a more or less homogeneous society is an important condition for a stable political system. Heterogeneity in terms of race, language, or religion is supposed to put the stability of a political system at risk. However, a more refined version of this argument is that it is not heterogeneity as such that threatens the stability of a political system, but

the extent to which conflict dimensions are cross-cutting rather than mutually reinforcing. As Lipset (1960: 89) argues:

... the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations. To the degree that a significant proportion of the population is pulled among conflicting forces, its members have an interest in reducing the intensity of political conflict.

If we apply this logic to the European level, a truly European system of political representation requires crosscutting cleavages. If political parties (of the same EP group) across member states develop widely different party manifestos and profiles during their election campaigns, and if the voters of these parties also have widely different policy priorities and vote according to different considerations across Europe, then a truly European system of political representation is certainly out of reach. On the other hand, the more similarity we discover at each level, the more justified we are in concluding that a truly European system of political representation is in the making.

The major challenge for an effective democratic political system at the European level is to overcome the traditional dividing lines in Europe, the national borders. The more political differences coincide with national borders, the more disruptive the politicization of these differences will be. On the other hand, the more political parties base their policy appeals on cross-national cleavages rather than on national interests, the more important they will be as a factor of integration.

From the argument above three requirements and as many research questions with regard to European political parties and EP groups can be deduced.

  1. Political parties should basically agree on the institutional arrangements of the EU.

  2. The ideological and policy-profile of European political parties should be sufficiently distinct so that citizens when voting indeed have a choice between different policy proposals.

  3. National party systems can be elevated and aggregated to the European level without losing their competitiveness, in the sense of distinctiveness, and cohesion. This can only be the case when national systems are compatible.

In previous research we found that the party groups operative in the European Parliament meet these requirements surprisingly well. The three major party groups are all strongly in favor of further European integration, whereas their positions on two major issue dimensions, the left-right dimension and the libertarian-traditional dimension, are quite distinct and cohesive (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, Thomassen and Schmitt 1999). Members of Parliament are organized in political groups rather than in national delegations. More important, their roll-call behavior generally follows their political group membership rather than their nationality. Also, their views on a range of important issues are again determined by their political background and not by their nationality (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, Thomassen et al. 2003). This striking potential to aggregate and integrate dimensions of conflict across national borders is a result of historical commonalities in the cleavage structure of most (West European) countries.

However, as informative as these findings are, they are not sufficient for the feasibility of a truly European system of political representation to be fully assessed. The policy positions taken in the European parliament are at the end rather than the beginning of the process of political representation. The ability of national political party delegations to come to terms within the context of the European Parliament does not necessarily reflect a great similarity in the policy options offered to voters within the context of national politics. In order to see to what extent the policy proposals of national political parties, which belong to the same party federation or EP group, are compatible, we need to compare what they present to their electorates. Therefore, we shall try to assess to what extent the three requirements are met on the basis of the electoral manifestos they developed for the 1999 European Parliament elections.

In order to keep this task manageable, we confine ourselves to two main policy dimensions. The relative agreement of political parties on the institutional arrangements are assessed on a general Pro/Anti-EU dimension. Our assessment of the extent to which the second and third requirements are met is based on the main dimension of party competition, the left-right dimension (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Sani and Sartori 1983), which is assumed to be capable of summarizing the positions that political parties take in a great variety of different policy areas (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989). How positions of individual parties on

these dimensions can be established by way of content analyses of their Euromanifestos is explained in some detail in Appendix A of this paper. It may therefore suffice at this point to state the basic idea of the procedure. This idea is to determine the share of "leftist" and "rightist" arguments in a Euromanifesto, subtract the two proportions from one another such that small figures indicate a predominance of leftist expressions, and calibrate the resulting distribution to a range from 1 (left-most position) to 10 (right-most).4 The same is done for the European position-taking, where 1 stands for the most EU-critical and 10 for the most EU-favorable position. Note that this procedure is not newly invented here, but rather has a long tradition in the content analyses of the MRG group (see, e.g., Budge, Klingemann et al., 2001).

On this basis let us try to answer the first of our three remaining research questions. Do political parties basically agree on the institutional arrangements of the EU? The answer is yes. European party federations and beyond that, the political groups in the European Parliament largely agree on the institutional make-up of the Union (see Table 4). This holds both in a between-group and within-group perspective. Between the groups, it is only the small "Europe of Democracies and Diversities", which is clearly at odds with the current functioning of the EU. The equally small United Left is hesitant because its overall position is in the neutral centre of the distribution. The other groups and parties, however, among them the mighty European People's Party and the Party of European Socialists, are clearly backing the institutional arrangements of the Union. In other words, there is broad agreement on the EU between the central party federations and EP groups, while in some countries at least voters do find EU-critical voices which they can support if they so wish.

The same holds true in an intraparty federation/EP group perspective. The consensus on the desired development of the Union reaches far. It is only in one group, the Europe of Democracies and Diversities group, that we find greater variation between the member parties on European questions than on matters related to left and right. In one other group, the Europe of Nations group, within-group variations along these two dimensions are equally large. Everywhere else the members are in greater agreement on Europe than on matters of left and right. This is particularly pronounced in the case of the two almost hegemonic parties of the

Table 4. Distinctiveness and cohesion of EP party groups: left-right and pro-anti Europe (figures are means and standard deviations of party positions on a 10-point scale and are based on differentials of arguments that parties make in their Euromanifesto)

United Left

Greens

PES

ELDR

EoN

EDD

EPP

Left-right differential

Mean

3.9

4.3

4.9

5.1

5.7

6.1

6.5

Standard deviation

0.9

0.5

0.8

1.4

1.0

0.5

1.2

Pro-Anti EU differential

Mean

5.3

5.8

6.7

6.6

5.8

4.2

6.3

Standard deviation

0.7

0.4

0.4

0.5

1.0

0.9

0.4

No. of manifestos of member parties coded/not coded

12/7

10/2

15/3

11/3

3/3

4/1

19/9

EP voting power covered by the manifesto analysis #

61

89

91

77

78

83

87

European party system - the socialist PES and the Christian-democratic and conservative EPP. In these two mighty multinational party federations, disagreement on Europe is only half (PES) or one-third of the size (EPP) of the respective disagreement on matters of left and right. We conclude that there is indeed a broad consensus on the institutional arrangement in the EU both within and between the central parties of the system.

Our second research question refers to the required differences between parties. Is the ideological and policy profile of European political parties sufficiently distinct that citizens when voting have a choice between different policy proposals? Relying on the left-right differential in the parties' Euromanifestos in that regard, we again arrive at an affirmative answer. We find that there are ideological and policy differences between the party federations and party groups in the European Parliament. Striking at first sight is the imbalance that characterizes the competition structure in the European Parliament - with the socialists, along with the liberals, in the centre, and the European People's Party far out on the right. However, this view might be biased because the socialists have two organized competitors on their left - the United Left and

the Greens - while the members of the house from extreme right parties are not formally organized within the European Parliament and belong to the "non-inscrits", the non-attached group.

Our third and final research question in this section is whether national party systems can be aggregated sufficiently well on a EU level - and thereby elevated or "promoted" to a truly EU party system - without losing their competitiveness and cohesiveness. We have already dealt in some detail with the question of competitiveness - EU parties and EP groups are taking ideologically distinct positions. Hence, competitiveness will not be the problem in the elevation or promotion process. The matter is different with regard to the relative cohesiveness of the different parties and/or groups. If we restrict our analysis to the Union-wide groups, i.e. the true multinational forces, the United Left, the Greens, and the Socialists are found to be cohesive. However, there appear to be problems of cohesiveness - indicated by elevated left-right standard deviation - within the Christian-conservative EPP and the liberal ELDR. The reason is quite obvious in both cases. Both the EPP and the ELDR bridge a gap between two distinct political traditions. On the EPP side, it is the distinction between Christian-democratic parties that belong to the founding member parties, and the later additions of conservative parties like the British or Spanish. On the ELDR side, the major difference among the member parties is whether they have their roots in a libertarian (e.g. D'66) or a liberal-conservative tradition (e.g. VVD).

In conclusion

In addressing the ongoing debate on the democratic quality and legitimacy of the EU, we have focused on the recent argument that at least in the foreseeable future the EU will be unable to develop an input-oriented legitimization because of the lack of a 'thick' collective identity and therefore should be satisfied with an output-oriented legitimization. We raised several questions with regard to this debate.

First, we addressed two empirical questions. Output-oriented legitimization assumes both a common perception across the EU of the most important problems to be solved and a common understanding that these problems should be solved at European level. Our findings with regard to these questions are mixed. At the time of our study in 1999, unemployment across Europe was seen as the most important problem,

although not in each and every country. At the same time the willingness of people to allocate responsibility for important policy domains at the European level was higher than is often assumed. However, people also seem inclined to keep the national state responsible for policies that are really important in their daily lives.

Secondly, we addressed questions of an analytical and normative nature. We took issue with the argument that a well-developed democratic political system at the European level requires a thick collective identity. The concept of a 'demos' is not identical to the concept of a 'people' (Volk) in a sociological sense. Historically, the establishment of a national state often preceded and led to a feeling of national identity rather than of being based on it. We expressed our doubts about the democratic quality of a democracy based solely on government for the people. In reference to Schumpeter, we argued that according to this definition there are no criteria to distinguish a well-performing democratic system from a dictatorship delivering the output that people want. And even if output-oriented legitimization is understood in the broader sense of a Madisonian type of democracy, the democratic character of such a system is still a matter of dispute.

We argued that once political decisions are taken at European level there is every reason to apply the same normative democratic principles to the EU as are applicable to its member states. In modern politics, democracy almost by definition means representative democracy, and representative democracy supposes a competitive party system. We therefore addressed the question to what extent a competitive party system at European level, if not already in place, would be feasible. We argued that a stable competitive party system at European level is only feasible when three requirements are met. First, political parties have to agree on the basic institutional arrangements of the Union. Secondly, political parties at European level have to take distinct ideological and policy positions. Thirdly, this implies that it ought to be possible to elevate national political party systems to the European level without shedding their distinctiveness and cohesion.

An analysis of the party manifestos of national political parties prepared for the 1999 elections for the European parliament proved that these requirements are reasonably well met. This analysis completes a triangle. Previously, we tried to analyze the same research questions on

the basis of roll-call analyses and on the issue positions of individual members of parliament. They all pointed in the same direction. However, the results of the analysis of party manifestos are less clear-cut than the results of the other two methods. Further research should clarify why this is the case.

Notes

1. Eijk, Cees van der; Mark Franklin, Hermann Schmitt, et al. (2002) European Elec- tions Study 1999: Design, Implementation and Results (Computer File and Codebook). Amsterdam: Steinmetz Archives.

2. In the English master questionnaire, the precise question wording of the survey data to be analyzed is the following:Q1a. What do you think are the most important problems facing "your country"?[INT: note as many problems as R mentions. If R starts telling stories, ask to sum- marize in one or two words.]Q1b. [If more than one problem mentioned:] Of those you have mentioned what would you say is the single most important problem?Q1d. As of today, is "the most important issue" mainly dealt with by regional, national, or European political authorities?1 regional 2 national 3 European 8 dk 9 naQ1e. And who do you think would be most appropriate to deal with "the most important issue": regional, national, or European political authorities?1 regional 2 national 3 European 8 dk 9 na

3. This question was not asked in Italy.

4. Note that this calibration is done in order to be able in later analyses to compare manifesto-generated party positions with the positions that their voters take. In the framework of the European Election Studies, the latter are established by 10-point self-placement scales (e.g. the left-right scale).

5. http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp-64.pdf

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Appendix A

The Euromanifestos Project

The Euromanifestos Project has been designed within the framework of the European Elections Study 1999 in order to determine the input of political parties to the electoral communication process. Its findings are being analysed in comparison to the results of the post-electoral voter survey of the same study, as well as in conjunction with a media content analysis covering the political debate during the election campaign.

This chapter presents some of the results of our study of the manifestos that political parties issued on the occasion of the European Parliament election of 1999 - even though the Danish, Portuguese and some Belgian documents are not coded yet and a number of other documents are still missing from our Euromanifesto collection. Since the coding scheme and the procedure used to apply it have been documented thoroughly elsewhere (Wüst/Volkens 2003), and are also available online,5 we can be brief in describing the basic philosophy of our content analysis.

The Euromanifesto Project follows two different routes in determining the content of the European Election programs of political parties. On the one hand, a computerized coding strategy is pursued in order to determine in great detail the topical issues of the 1999 manifestos. This is done so that the manifestos can be compared in as much detail as possible to the answers respondents in our post-election survey give on the open-ended agenda question (which is also analyzed in this chapter). On the other hand, the well-established MRG coding scheme has been applied - in an adapted and modified version - to the coding of the manifestos of all parties ever represented in the European Parliament from its first direct election in 1979 to the present.

A few new elements were added to the original MRG coding frame in the Euromanifesto Coding Scheme (EMCS). These comprise a whole domain containing the EC/EU codes and the governmental frame. In the original MRG coding frame, only two codes refer to the EC/EU: code 108 (EU positive) and 110 (EU negative). These codes do not suffice, however, to capture the content of Euromanifestos. We have retained these two codes, which now apply to general pro-/anti-EU arguments and to respective arguments on the further deepening of the EU. In addi-

tion, we have split domain 3 (political system) into domains 3.1 (political system in general) and 3.2 (political system of the EU) to cover most of the more constitutional issues of the debate on the future of the EU. The codes in table A1 are meant to capture the parties' positions on institutional discussions on the political system of the EU, on enlargement, and on unspecified protests to the system as such. Wherever we considered it necessary, we have, in addition to the codes of domain 3.2, added EU- specific sub-codes to existing codes, e.g. 2-2021 (lack of democracy in the EU) to 2-202 (democracy in the EU). All codes of domain 3.2 and all sub-codes can be regrouped into the original 108/110 categories of the MRG, which guarantees comparability with the content of national manifestos that have been coded according to the original MRG coding scheme.

Table A-1. Categories of the "New" Domain 3.2 of the EMCS

2-306

Competences of the European Parliament: Positive

2-307

Competences of the European Parliament: Negative

2-308

Competences of the European Commission: Positive

2-309

Competences of the European Commission: Negative

2-310

Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers: Positive

2-311

Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers: Negative

2-312

Competences of the European Court of Justice: Positive

2-313

Competences of the European Court of Justice: Negative

2-314

Competences of Other EC/EU Institutions: Positive

2-315

Competences of Other EC/EU Institutions: Negative

2-316

EC/EU Enlargement: Positive

2-317

EC/EU Enlargement: Negative

2-318

Complexity of the EC/EU Political System

We have added a couple of new domains to the MRG, but Table A-1 demonstrates another major difference: we have added an additional first digit separated by a hyphen from the 3-digit content code (or 4-digit sub- code). This first digit indicates the political level which each coded argument refers to or is embedded within - national, EU, or unspecific. Generally, almost all arguments can refer to all three levels. However, the categories of domain 3.2 can only refer to the European level. This is justified on substantive grounds, as a discussion on institutional aspects of

the EU is normally framed in terms of European government. In addition, there are a few more sub-codes that are also limited to either the national (e.g. 1-1101 Financing the EU: negative) or the European level of government (2-4086/87: EMU/European Currency: positive/negative).

The use we make of the growing Euromanifesto database in the present chapter is restricted to the 1999 manifestos, and to the information that can be derived from the EMCS with regard to the position-taking of political parties on the pro-anti EU dimension and the left-right dimension. How are these positions determined? Consider again Table A-1. In this new domain, EU-related political statements can be coded in either a positive or a negative category. If we strike a balance after having coded an entire manifesto, we can determine the relative prevalence of pro- or anti-EU arguments of a political party in this document, i.e. this party's EU position as it emerges from this particular manifesto. It can range from -100 (i.e. all arguments negative) to +100 (i.e. all arguments positive). In order to arrive at a scale that is more directly comparable to our survey information, we have determined - empirically - what the most negative score in all Euromanifestos from 1979 on is, what the most positive score is, and have rescaled this range to a 10- point scale with 1 meaning "very EU critical" and 10 "very EU positive".

The same is done with regard to the left-right dimension, following the MRG routine as documented in Budge, Klingemann et al. (2001).

Appendix B

Left-Right and Pro-Anti-EU Positions of the Member Parties of the Political Groups of the European Parliament 1999 Determined According to their Euromanifestos

Table B-1. Left-Right and Pro-Anti-EU Positions of Member Parties of the European Peo- ple's Party (EPP)

Party (acronym)

Country

EP seats

Left-Right position

Pro/anti-EU position

Unionists (UUP)

UK

1

4.3

5.7

Christian Democrats (KD)

Sweden

2

4.6

5.9

Conservatives (CON)

UK

36

4.7

6.8

National Coalition (KOK)

Finland

4

5.1

6.4

Neo-Gaullists (RPR-DL)

France

12

5.3

6.7

Fianna Fail (FF)

Ireland

6

5.6

6.0

Christian Democrats (ÖVP)

Austria

7

6.0

6.6

Christian Union (SKL)

Finland

1

6.2

5.3

Conservatives (PP)

Spain

27

6.3

6.4

Conservatives (ND)

Greece

9

6.4

5.7

Centre-Right (UDF)

France

6

6.4

6.8

Christian Democrats (CSV)

Luxembourg

2

6.9

6.3

Christian Democrats (CDA)

Netherlands

9

7.0*

6.4*

Christian Democrats (CDU)

Germany

43

7.3

6.2

Conservatives (M)

Sweden

5

7.4

7.1

Christian Socials (CSU)

Germany

10

7.8

5.7

Christian Democrats (PPI)

Italy

4

8.2

6.6

Populists (FI)

Italy

22

8.7

6.2

Christian Democrats (CCD)

Italy

2

9.6

6.3

Mean party position

6.5

6.3

Standard deviation

1.2

0.4

Party mean (weighted #)

6.6

6.4

Standard deviation

1.1

0.3

Table B-2. Left-Right and Pro-Anti-EU Positions of the Member Parties of the Party of European Socialists (PES)

Party (acronym)

Country

EP seats

Left-Right position

Pro/anti-EU position

Social Democrats (S)

Sweden

6

1.9

5.9

Social Democrats (SDP)

Finland

3

3.0

7.2

Labour (Lab)

Ireland

1

4.0

6.5

Social

Democrat and Labour

UK

1

4.0

6.5

(SDLP)

Socialists (SP)

Belgium

2

4.7

6.4

Socialists (PASOK)

Greece

9

4.8

6.2

Social Democrats (LSAP)

Luxemburg

2

5.0

7.0

Socialists (PS)

Belgium

3

5.2

7.1

Labour (PvdA)

Netherlands

6

5.3

6.8

Social Democrats (SPD)

Germany

33

5.7*

6.6*

Labour (Lab)

UK

29

5.7*

6.6*

Socialists (PS)

France

22

5.7*

6.6*

Democratic Socialists (DS)

Italy

15

5.7

8.0

Social Democrats (SPÖ)

Austria

7

5.7*

6.6*

Socialists (PSOE)

Spain

24

5.9

6.8

Mean party position

4.9

6.7

Standard deviation

0.8

0.4

Party mean (weighted #)

5.4

6.7

Standard deviation

0.5

0.3

Table B-3. Left-Right and Pro-Anti-EU Positions of Member Parties of the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP)

Party (acronym)

Country

EP seats

Left-Right position

Pro/anti-EU position

Greens (GA)

Austria

1

3.4

5.7

Greens (Verts)

France

9

3.5

6.0

Greens (VIHR)

Finland

2

3.7

5.7

Greens

Ireland

2

4.0

5.6

Greens (DG)

Luxemburg

1

4.0

6.3

Greens (Grüne)

Germany

7

4.1

6.1

Galician nationalist (BNG)

Spain

1

4.2

5.3

Greens elected on LDP ticket

UK

2

4.4

5.1

Greens (MP)

Sweden

2

4.9

5.1

Green-Left (GL)

Netherlands

4

5.3

6.5

Greens (ecolo)

Belgium

3

5.3

5.9

Mean party position

4.3

5.8

Standard deviation

0.5

0.4

Party mean (weighted #)

4.2

5.9

Standard deviation

0.6

0.3

Table B-4. Left-Right and Pro-Anti-EU Positions of Member Parties of the European Liberal Democrats and Reformers (ELDR)

Party (acronym)

Country

EP seats

Left-Right position

Pro/anti-EU position

Liberals (PRL)

Belgium

2

3.6

7.2

Swedish Party (SFP)

Finland

1

4.1

7.4

Democrats (PD/DP)

Luxembourg

1

4.3

6.9

Centre (KESK)

Finland

4

4.4

6.9

Social-Liberals (D'66)

Netherlands

2

4.5

7.2

Centre (C)

Finland

1

4.6

6.0

Liberal-Democrats (LDP)

UK

10

4.6

6.1

Catalan nationalists (CiU)

Spain

2

5.1

6.1

Liberals (FP)

Sweden

3

5.4

6.2

Orthodox Liberals (VVD)

Netherlands

6

6.7

6.6

Liberals (PRI)

Italy

1

8.3

5.9

Mean party position

5.1

6.6

Standard deviation

1.4

0.5

Party mean (weighted #)

5.1

6.5

Standard deviation

0.8

0.4

Table B-5. Left-Right and Pro-Anti-EU Positions of Member Parties of the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (United Left)

Party (acronym)

Country

EP seats

Left-Right position

Pro/anti-EU position

Communists (RC)

Italy

3

1.3

5.4

Communists (VAS)

Finland

1

1.4

5.7

Revolutionary Left (PGR)

France

1

3.2

5.4

Communists (IU)

Spain

4

3.2

6.2

Communists (VP)

Sweden

1

3.5

4.0

Communists (PCI)

Italy

2

3.7

6.5

Post-Communists (PDS)

Germany

7

3.8

6.1

Dem & Soc Mov (DKK)

Greece

1

3.8

6.1

Trotkists (LO)

France

3

3.9

4.2

Communists (KKE)

Greece

3

4.1

4.5

Socialists (SP)

Netherlands

1

4.1

3.8

Progressive Left (SYN)

Greece

3

4.9

5.8

Mean party position

3.6

5.3

Standard deviation

0.9

0.7

Party mean, weighted #

3.6

5.5

Standard deviation

0.7

0.7

Table B-6. Left-Right and Pro-Anti-EU Positions of Member Parties of the Union for Europe of the Nations Group (EoN)

Party (acronym)

Country

EP seats

Left-Right position

Pro/anti-EU position

Fianna Fail (FF)

Ireland

6

4.0

6.8

Rassemblement pour la France (RPF)

France

2

6.4

4.4

Alleanza Nationale (AN)

Italy

10

6.6

6.3

Mean party position

5.7

5.8

Standard deviation

1.0

1.0

Party mean (weighted #)

5.7

6.3

Standard deviation

1.3

0.4

Table B-7. Left-Right and Pro-Anti-EU Positions of Member Parties of the Europe of Democracies and Diversities Group (EDD)

Party (acronym)

Country

EP seats

Left-Right position

Pro/anti-EU position

Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Tradition (CPNT)

France

5

5.3

4.5

Independence Party (UKIP)

UK

3

6.0

2.4

Rassemblement pour la France (RPF)

France

4

6.4

4.4

Christen Unie (CU)

Netherlands

3

6.7

5.4

Mean party position

6.1

4.2

Standard deviation

0.5

0.9

Party mean, weighted #

6.0

4.2

Standard deviation

0.5

0.7