This article examines what influence the cabinet has on the structure of Norwegian ministries. A central question is why the ministerial structure during the first thirty years after the Second World War were very stable followed by big changes after 1990. This is examined based on theories of political design and institutional change. The article shows that merging, splitting, and movement of departments are more common that pure birth and death, that changes are more common on department level than on ministry level, that from 1990 change of ministerial structure have become more common when cabinet change, that changes are more common when there is ideological change between cabinets and also more common when there are coalition cabinets. Non-socialist cabinets are more active by changing the ministerial structure than cabinet dominated by the Labor party. Old ministries with strong stakeholders and ministries with core state tasks such as finance, foreign affairs and defense are more robust than new ministries.

Scholars of history, political science and sociology have written about the Norwegian Director of Health from 1938 to 1971, Karl Evang (1902-1981). Evang’s political radicalism and his strong personality are often emphasized, and the Directorate of Health is known as the prime example of a new expert administration in Norway. This article explores how tensions between policy and administration appeared within one specific field of health policy, the issue of the birth control clinics. These clinics (the first opened in 1924) were given state funds from the mid- 1930s. As Director of Health, Evang advocated public funding, but there were strong conflicts in Parliament about the state’s involvement in improving access to birth control. Thus, the roles of a civil servant: loyalty, neutrality and professional independence, are discussed in this case study of relations between Evang and the ministers he served under. The sources are Parliamentary documents, Evang’s publications and biographical material. The analysis shows that Evang was implementing the governmental policy, to which the opposition was critical. He was loyal to his ministers, but when these gave less or no support to the birth control clinics he exercised his professional independence while at the same time demonstrating his loyalty to the Labor Party’s women’s movement.

The spring of 2016, after six failed attempts in three decades, local self-government was finally incorporated in the Norwegian Constitution. Previously, politicians had been in doubt: Exactly what was to be established by law, and what would be the consequences? This article, which aims to explain the political scepticism, focuses on the ambivalence concerning the very concept local self-government. The sense of the term, deep-rooted as it is in Norwegian political rhetorics, has changed in recent decades. It expresses to a larger extent a judicial and political ambition to build a municipal defence against the state. This makes the expression less relevant and politically more problematic. The scepticism is also explained by historical experiences. Historically, the flexibility of the institutional framework surrounding the municipalities secured that local democracy could play an important part in the development of the Norwegian welfare society. Parliament’s ʻyes’ on the 7^th attempt, shows us that the politicians now felt confident this amendment to the Constitution would not give any unintended and unwanted consequences for central state policy vis-à-vis the municipalities.

The point of departure of this article is the central theses of the Research project on power and democracy in Norway 1998 – 2003 (“Makt- og demokratiutredningen 1998 – 2003») – «the retreat of politics» and «the fragmentation of the state». On the grounds of recent works on the History of the Central State Administration and Parliament, the author argues that the position of politics is strengthened rather than weakened in central state institutions, and that the central political and administrative institutions of the state have become more integrated, rather than fragmented.

In a long time perspective we have been witnessing a steady expansion of politics. The author argues that more fields of society have become objects of political decision also after the breakthrough of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 90s. More specifically he argues that politization, understood as the steady transformation of the Central State Administration into a better tool for the development of politics, has been the dominant line of development of administrative policy from 1945 to today. He also argues that Makt- og demokratiutredningen underestimates the new tools of political and administrative governance developed, especially during the 1990s.

The author agrees that judicialization may inflict restrictions on politics. It is however also a product of politics, and often a result of higher political ambitions. Rather than emphasizing the contrasts between politics and law, it seems natural to highlight the symbiosis between them.

The author also agrees that the Central State Administration has become more differentiated and specialized through the split and specialization of administrative areas and institutions, and by the devolution of administrative bodies into corporations or corporation-like judicial forms on the border-line of the state – an «outer state». At the same time, however, he argues that the «inner state» has become more integrated. In the ministries politicians and bureaucrats cooperate ever more in the service of politics. And the integration over the divide parliament – executive power has become considerably stronger through the intensified parliamentary control of the executive, the interaction between parliamentarians, the cabinet and the ministries, and a strengthened tendency of broad political settlements.

The Norwegian Power and Democracy Study was established by Parliament as an independent research program running from 1998 to 2003. The major conclusion was that substantial amounts of political power had been transferred from elected assemblies to institutions that were not held to account in elections. The judicialization of politics was part of this conclusion. The article is responding to a critique saying that the state has preserved more control than foreseen by the Study. The response endorses some parts of this objection, particularly the arguments that the bureaucracy is more efficiently organized and that a revised budget procedure gives better control. Still, the article concludes that the theses of judicialization and the transfer of power by the European Economic Space Agreement confirms substantial parts of the message from the Power Study.