De senere år har sett en tiltagende interesse for Anscombes handlingsfilosofi og hennes verk, Intention. Én ting Anscombe gjør her er å gjenopplive begrepet om praktisk kunnskap: en type kunnskap aktøren spontant kommer i besittelse av gjennom intensjonell, villet aktivitet. I det følgende argumenterer jeg for at dette begrepet lar seg analysere innenfor et metafysisk rammeverk der den praktiske kunnskapen i handling er et direkte kausalt produkt av praktisk tenkning snarere enn noe som blir mediert gjennom kognitive prosesser.
Lately there has been a revival of interest for the philosophy of action developed by G.E.M. Anscombe. In particular, we have seen different positions claiming to integrate, accommodate and develop some of the basic insights Anscombe put forward in Intention: in particular, the idea that intentional actions have a peculiar epistemology that grants its agent spontaneous knowledge of their actions. In this essay, I discuss some of the background for agreeing with Anscombe and her claim that actions must be known by their author. Moreover, I argue that such claims will have important consequences for action theory and the way we understand actions: in particular, I argue that we must find a way to integrate knowledge of one’s actions into the very nature of these actions themselves thereby seeing actions as a way of knowing. I then discuss and refute one of the most debated positions – i.e. cognitivism about intentional actions – before proceeding to argue that Anscombe’s original insight can be sustained within a causal framework of the metaphysics of knowledge.
Philosophical dialogues with prison inmates – critical reflection towards wondering
The concept of philosophical practice has its origin from Germany, and different theories on the field have been published since 1982. Philosophical practice generally refers to philosophical dialogues, which briefly can be described as dialogues where participants reflect critically upon different topics and issues. Ole Jacob Madsen criticized philosophical practice in NFT 2/2012 and interpreted it as a movement within the «therapeutic culture». I disagree with his view and criticism, and will argue against this in the article. Since 2006 I have engaged in philosophical dialogues with inmates, and these experiences form the foundation for my reflections upon philosophical dialogues, and also for my critical perspectives on theories within philosophical practice. Based on the question how to philosophize critically, openly and in wonder with inmates, I will in this article take a critical look at key concepts in philosophical practice in light of a conversation with an inmate. Finally I will present my own concepts that represent my attitude and perspective on philosophical dialogues. My article shows that the criticism from Madsen disregards the philosophical dialogues inherent value.