Freges oppfatning av logikk: fra Kant til Grundgesetze
- Side: 219-228
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.18261/ISSN1504-2901-2013-03-04-04
- Publisert på Idunn: 2013-12-09
- Publisert: 2013-12-09
Øystein Linnebo: Frege’s conception of logic: From Kant to Grundsätze
I first argue that Frege started out with a conception of logic that is closer to Kant’s than is generally recognized, after which I analyze Frege’s reasons for gradually rejecting this view. Although conceding that the demands posed by Frege’s logicism played some role, I argue that his increasingly vehement anti-psychologism provides a deeper and more interesting reason for rejecting his earlier view.