- Alle tidsskrifter
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Levinas’ conception of the Other as asymmetrical in relation to the Same is an expressed attempt to overcome all forms of equality- and analogy thinking about human beings, as he sees this to be a source of reduction of the Other to the Same. However, the feminine Other is described as being in a symmetrical relation to the Same, in the form of a contradiction. Why does Levinas give the concept of feminine alterity this kind of status? This is the central question addressed in this article. The answer, as such, represents a clear criticism of his concept of feminine alterity in the light of Beauvoirs The Second Sex. The concept is both inconsistent and given as an unethical simplification. In contrast to how Levinas unfolds the concept of the Other, «feminine otherness,» is marked by him letting tradition precede thinking. Thus his concept is caught in the horizon in which the idea of «woman» traditionally has been framed, namely the male ego sphere. Levinas' notion of the feminine can largely be said to include key features of Beauvoir's critical concept of woman as the second sex, and it is therefore directly affected by Beauvoir's criticism.
In this article the main focus is to analyse and present the Works of Love (Kjærlighetens gjerninger) by Søren Kierkegaard , and through the critique of Adorno, illustrate the perspective of love that is present in Kierkegaards text, and in doing so I will try to reestablish and widen the concept of charity. I will argue that the lack of a societal surrounding Adorno is highligning, is precisely what makes Kierkegaards concept of love that robust, and it is necessary in the argumentation for establishing a concept of charity that contains equality between human beings. Is the essence of love expressed through our ability to value and treat other human beings in mcuh the same way, to look beyond their individual characteristics and love the person unconditionally? Or is it rather the case that because of the individual characteristics of a human -being, we are capable of loving it? To offer charity, do you then have the ability and will to act according to it, or is charity to be understood primarily in a historical context and at a certain place? These questions will be adressed in this article.
The «Skillelinjen circle» was a philosophical study group established in Oslo in the late 1920s. The group was inspired by Heinrich Rickert’s Neo-Kantianism, with which it hoped to counter naturalist and positivist currents in culture and philosophy. This ambition was clearly expressed in their programmatic anthology Skillelinjen (The Dividing Line), published in 1929. It was to be their first and only publication. The circle soon disbanded, and its members went their separate ways. There are probably several reasons why the attempt to organize a Neo-Kantian movement stranded. In this article I argue that a significant philosophical tension was evident already in Skillelinjen. Until now, scholars have portrayed Skillelinjen as a consistent idealistic manifesto. I argue however, based on an analysis of Charles Kent and Ingjald Nissen’s articles in the anthology, that they express different forms of Kantianism, and ultimately two incompatible views on idealism.
Originally the word «philosophy» had the love of wisdom as one core meaning, and it was conducted as practice. Philosophical dialogues that enables movement from the concrete, contextual and individual towards an abstract, conceptual and general, has potential to lead human beings towards human maturity and wisdom, is the thesis that is dicussed in this article. A dynamic relationship between the individual and the general – the subjective and objective – needs to be established if this is to happen. I have tried to do so in the Dialogos approach to philosophical dialogue, which is briefly described. Against this background I discuss three different approaches to practical philosophy, namely the philosophical practice of Oscar Brenifier, the dialogues of David Bohm, and the Socratic dialogue approach of Leonard Nelson and Gustav Heckman. My question is: To what extent are these practical-philosophical approaches educative practices that leads in the direction of human maturity and wisdom? My conclusion is that non of these approaches are suitable in schools in their pure versions, but thought together and adjusted they can all contribute in establishing educational practice that might do so.