Vitenskapelig publikasjon
(side 248-259)
av Thomas Krogh
This paper discusses the relationship between what we today would call the strictly philosophical parts of Humes works and his monumental and once popular History of England. In the ...
Engelsk sammendrag
Freedom. Equality.
Security
This paper discusses the relationship between what we today would
call the strictly philosophical parts of Hume’s works and his monumental
and once popular History of England. In the first
part I present an overview of this work and claims that it can by no
means be considered a traditional narrative concentrating on actions
of princes and statesmen. Instead I find a clear tendency in Hume
to present his main theme – constitutional change in England – within
a framework of economic and general cultural development. In the
second part I present an exegesis of Hume’s view of human nature,
arguing that Hume never claimed that the human condition was stable,
but only that an invariant basis may take on radically different
forms given diverse circumstances. Finally, I contrast Hume’s portrait
of modernity with Max Weber’s version, finding Hume to rely more
on non-cognitive mechanisms and politics than new form forms of especially
economical rationality.
Keywords:Hume’s History and its metodology,Hume on the historical role of religion,Hume’s view of human nature,Hume’s theory of the modern world.
Vitenskapelig publikasjon
(side 262-276)
av Paul Rækstad
David Hume's theoretical philosophy was long dominated by the interpretation of him as a skeptical empiricist as found in the writings of Read, Beattie, Green etc. Although this has ...
Engelsk sammendrag
David Hume and the Psychology of
Causal Induction
David Hume's theoretical philosophy was long dominated by the
interpretation of him as a skeptical empiricist as found in the
writings of Read, Beattie, Green etc. Although this has changed
substantially the last half-century – especially with the advent
of the «New Hume Debate» – there is much work that remains to be
done, especially in regard to his analysis of causal induction.
In this essay I argue that Hume's analysis of, and arguments surrounding,
causal induction should not be read as an attempt at doing skeptical
metaphysics and/or epistemology, but rather as an early form of
cognitive psychology. I argue this thesis in three steps. In the
first two sections I analyze Hume's account of his general and more
specific project(s) in the Treatise and the first Enquiry and
show that Hume takes himself to be doing empirical and experimental psychology.
I then turn to Hume's specific argumentation concerning causal induction,
where I show that rather than establishing a skeptical position,
his arguments prefigure contemporary poverty of stimulus-arguments
for innate cognitive mechanisms unexplainable by (at least certain)
general-purpose means, and that he can fruitfully be situated along
other Scottish thinkers in advancing an early conception of the Duplex
Mind.
Keywords:Hume,Causality,Induction,Psychology,Duplex Mind
Vitenskapelig publikasjon
(side 278-290)
av Øystein Lundestad
Habermas discourse ethics is today one of the most prominent and influential theories within practical philosophy and a wide range of social sciences. Nevertheless, Habermas is from the beginning of ...
Engelsk sammendrag
The Differentiation
of Habermas’ Discourse theory.
Habermas’ discourse ethics is today one of the most prominent
and influential theories within practical philosophy and a wide
range of social sciences. Nevertheless, Habermas is from the beginning
of the 1990s and onwards adamantly clear on the point that his theory
is not an ethical one. Rather, it is to be described as discourse theory,
although he occasionally sticks with the established term discourse
ethics. The article sets out to demonstrate why this change of name
and an ensuing restructuring of the entire theoretical framework
take place, and why these changes are also strictly necessary from
a normative perspective. I argue that it is a much needed clarification
of the practical-philosophical terms of ethics, morality and right
and their internal relationship that constitutes a main, but often
overlooked source for this important development within Habermas’
overall theory. In particular, a new understanding of the role of
institutionalised law and legal discourses in regulating human interaction leads
to a differentiation of discourse theory that sets him apart from
both his earlier writings and the theses of his good friend and
colleague Karl-Otto Apel.
Keywords:Habermas,practical philosophy,discourse ethics,discourse theory,ethics,morality,right,the institutionalisation of law
Vitenskapelig publikasjon
(side 295-310)
av Morten Kinander
Engelsk sammendrag
Rationality and Justice in Kant and
Rawls
The article is an analysis for Rawls' conception of rationality in the heritage from Kant,
with a focus on the differences between the categorical imperative and the original
position - perhaps the philosophers' two most famous constructions - and corresponding
concepts with a view to how they conceive of the rational actor. It is argued
that Rawls' position is suprisingly inconsistent with Kant's moral philosphy, and even
though this becomes clearer and more recognized as Rawls' philosophy develops,
this has always been the case. Instead, it is argued that Rawls' project is closer to
Kant's political philosophy. Kant's political philosophy is, however, not present in
Rawls' own works as an inspiration, and it is not as a political thinker that Rawls claims
Kantian inspiration. In this light, Rawls is not the deontologist which he is known for
being.
Keywords:Kant, Rawls, deontology, categorical imperative, original position, overlapping
consensus, public reason, justice as fairness, Kantian constructivism, rationality
Vitenskapelig publikasjon
(side 314-325)
av Kim-Erik Berts
When thinking about the concept of proof in mathematics, the connection to conviction and certainty seems inevitable. The task of the proof in mathematics is supposedly to convince someone of ...
Engelsk sammendrag
Kim-Erik Berts: Proof and Persuasion
When thinking about the concept of proof in mathematics, the
connection to conviction and certainty seems inevitable. The task
of the proof in mathematics is supposedly to convince someone of
the truth of a proposition. Proof then appears
to be a monolithic concept, and our requests for proof appear to
be motivated by a single, uniform need: to be persuaded. A natural
reaction to this seeming uniformity is a will to explain why a proof
can have this convincing effect. It is, however, worth considering
whether this tight association between proof and certainty does
justice to the concept of proof. This essay explores our need for
proofs through the consideration of an example of a simple rule
of arithmetic, which one wants to see proven. This shows that there
may different motives behind a request for a proof and that some
of these do not necessarily stem from a need to be persuaded. A
proof could have provided an answer but something else might have
been sufficient too. Thus, in mathematical practice proofs are found
to perform different tasks and cannot be understood exclusively
in terms of conviction. This has consequences for the philosophical
understanding of mathematics in general.
Keywords:proof,mathematics,certainty,conviction,mathematical practice
