This article addresses the discussions about mankinds relation to nature and the sensual aspects of subjectivity, and traces these back to two different approaches to nature and subjectivity in modernity. The first is the aesthetic tradition, where we both have tendencies to a disinterested and anti-sensualistic approach to art and experience – and theory and art that tries to memorize mankind's relation to nature and its attempt to retrieve itself as situated bodies in a real world. The second is the discussion about women as nature, where the defining of women as nature and body is the situation to be left. The article brings together these traditions by confronting T. W. Adorno's critical modernism with Hélène Cixous ecologically reflected concept of nature and non-constitutive theory of poetic production, and investigates how this encounter throws new light on the conception of art and critique of rationality.
The issue of how to justify right and wrong is a recurring methodological problem in ethics. We can, somewhat simplified, distinguish between people who argue that right and wrong must be confirmed by our moral convictions and people who maintain that morality must be justified by principles independent from these convictions. The issue hinges on arriving at a standard or criterion for when something is right or wrong. The author discusses this issue in light of the distinction between perfect procedural justice and pure procedural justice, drawing on the works of John Rawls and Peter Singer. One shortcoming affecting both these approaches is how they are unable to account for our basic beliefs. Using Ludwig Wittgensteins On Certainty as a point of departure, the author attempts to demonstrate that some of our basic beliefs cannot be formulated in propositions, but rather are expressed by our actions. The author concludes that we, in light of this, must distinguish between our ethical propositions and our basic beliefs. The former may be subject to doubt and may, consequently, be expressed in the form of propositions, whereas the latter is only expressed by what we say and what we do.
Ludvig Holberg (1684–1754) was a true Enlightenment thinker, radical and critic of all conventions including the gender hierarchy. That Ludvig Holberg not only defended women but was also a radical equality feminist, and wrote a history of famous women, seems to be relatively little known, even among feminists and gender researchers. This article aims to analyse Ludvig Holberg against the background of the European Querelle des femmes, and to place him in a Cartesian equality discourse with thinkers like François Poulain de la Barre.
The good life is a matter of basic attitude towards life and so the truth of hedonism depends on our subjective life-interpretation. No philosophical argument can cut through the genuinely practical, circular argument that our endorsement of pleasure as the ultimate good is crucial for having a good life in hedonistic terms. Besides supporting a theory-critical philosophy, such an understanding of hedonistic value perceives moral constraints on conduct such as moderation as a part of our practical wisdom. The aim is enjoying life as much as possible and not one of maximizing consumption. There is therefore, contrary to much common moral criticism of hedonism, no necessary connection between pleasure-seeking and gluttony. Hedonism understood as a form of life-interpretation rather than a pleasure-calculus also underpins basic liberal values such as toleration and privacy, questioning the inclination to making more and more of our private life a moral issue.
This article examines the phenomena of intersubjectivity and freedom in Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy in the context of our individualistic consumer society. The idea of the individual's responsibility in the situation announces the problem or aporia of intersubjectivity. The early philosophy of Sartre must consequently be seen in relation to a problem complex where the questions related to bad faith and an authentic life, freedom and anxiety and the aporetic aspects of the intersubjective dimension collaborate in understanding the historically, physically and socially situated subject. This is the foundation for an individualistic view of life where a self-realisation according to the term freedom will be central. This has some clear parallels to today's consumer society. The article thus problematizes whether Sartre's philosophy can be said to be a theoretical justification of processes of individualization or if aspects of his philosophy can have an emancipatory function in regard to the more deterministic aspects of the consumer society.