Denne artikkelen undersøker kongelig kommunikasjon under de mindreårige kongene Inge og Sigurd Haraldsson i 1130-årene. Som spede småbarn uten den fysiske og kognitive kapasiteten til å regjere, var kongene avhengige av aristokratiske formyndere til å fremme deres autoritet som individuelle herskere og fremheve monarkiets herredømme i et turbulent politisk landskap. Med fokus på overlevde fortellinger i *Hryggjarstykki – en nærmest samtidig narrativ – viser undersøkelsen hvordan lendmennene tok i bruk skriftlig og rituell kommunikasjon for å legitimere barnekongene på den ene siden, og bekrefte sin egen autoritet som kongelige verger på den andre. Undersøkelsen konsentrerer seg om tre eksempler som innebar en blanding av myte og propaganda: (i) et rykte som formidlet myten om kong Inges krigerske dåder; (ii) et brev som fabrikkerte diplomatisk korrespondanse mellom barnekongene; (iii) en seremoni som iscenesatte et rådgivningsmøte med kong Sigurd og hans menn. Mens nyere forskning har fokusert på kommunikasjonens rolle som drivkraft og instrument for den spirende monarkiske stat på sent 1100-tall og 1200-tallet, viser resultatene fra disse tidligere eksemplene at propaganda var like viktig og ofte like artikulert i den førstatlige konteksten.
This article examines royal communication during the minorities of the kings Inge and Sigurd Haraldsson, specifically between the years 1136 and 1139. As mere toddlers lacking the physical and cognitive capacity to govern, these dynasts were depended on baronial regents to promote their authority as individual rulers as well as champion the overall ascendency of the monarchy. Focusing on accounts derived from *Hryggjarstykki – a near contemporary narrative – this investigation shows how barons employed written and ritual communication in order to legitimize the child kings, on the one hand, and affirm their own authority as royal custodians, on the other. The investigation addresses three examples in particular, all of which entailed a combination of myth and propaganda: (i) a rumor propagated to inflate the myth of King Inge’s deeds in war; (ii) a letter fabricated to create the illusion of diplomatic correspondence between the two child kings; and (iii) a ceremony staged as a council session between King Sigurd and his men. While new research has focused on the role of communication as a driving force and instrument of the fledgling monarchical state in the late-twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the findings from these earlier examples demonstrate that propaganda war was equally consequential, and often articulated through similar media in the pre-state context.
I 1946 ble det utlyst en stilkonkurranse for norske skolebarn. Elever i 7. klasse fikk i oppgave å skrive om enten «Et minne fra krigen» eller om «Da freden kom». Fra hver skoleklasse ble to skolestiler valgt ut av læreren, og 189 skolestiler ble sendt inn til den nasjonale stilkonkurransen. Skolestilene er en unik kilde til barns egne opplevelser av 2. verdenskrig, og de danner utgangspunktet for denne artikkelen som diskuterer spørsmålet om hvordan barn minnes og forteller om krigen i nær etterkrigstid, og hva stilene kan fortelle om barns erfaringer og opplevelser av 2. verdenskrig.
In 1946, Norwegian school-children participated in a national competition in which 7th grade pupils were invited to write an essay about their experiences of WW II. They participated from all parts of Norway, with essays from each school handed in to the national jury. School essays are a unique source of knowledge: they give access to children’s voices, their memories and stories from WW II. Up until now, most of what we know of the war is narrated retrospectively and from the perspective of adults. Here, it is concluded that children experienced and reflected on the war in specific ways. Bombing and air-raids were sensed spontaneously and sometimes as fun and spectacular adventure. School essays inform us about how children experienced the negative effects of war: how family members disappeared, how they were in fear of their lives, how they had to evacuate and how they witnessed the horror of seeing massive material damage to homes and places where they lived. They also tell us, however, about how insecurity and fear became bearable if they had the support of close familial and communal ties in the name of a collective enemy. They tell us that children were eager to relate their participation in the resistance movement: girls as messengers and boys with independent duties on the home front. Through participation, children experienced being included in a broader and age-integrated community. In proving to themselves and their families that they mattered, and in mastering demanding and dangerous situations, they took on an air of importance. Pride and self-esteem increased. They could prove that they were competent agents who made a difference during the war. The essays reveal how children contributed to memories and to local and national narratives about WW II as well as to the building of a national identity in post-war Norway. Perceptions of the war represent norms and values such as national unification and resistance to a common enemy. It is concluded in this article that children in Norway contributed to the construction of such shared values.
Kvelden 6. september 1986 var luftrommet over Sola preget av et usedvanlig høyt støynivå. Om nysgjerrigheten grep deg og du rettet blikket mot himmelen, kunne du skimte tolv jagerfly, malt i grønt og brunt kamuflasjemønster. Dette var med andre ord ingen norske jagerfly. Flyene tilhørte den amerikanske nasjonalgardens 108. taktiske jagerflyving med hjembase på McGuire like utenfor New Jersey. Tidligere på dagen hadde jagerflyene forlatt sin hjembase med kurs mot Jæren. Etter å ha fløyet i syv timer uten stopp, ved hjelp av seks drivstoffyllinger i luften, var jagerflyene omsider i ferd med å lande på sin fremskutte krigsbase – Sola hovedflystasjon. De neste to ukene gjennomførte flyene øvingsoperasjoner over Nordsjøen, Sør-Norge og Danmark fra Sola. Også i 1978 og 1982 hadde Sola gjennom en to ukers periode fungert som fremskutt krigsbase for amerikanske jagerflyavdelinger fra nasjonalgarden oppsatt med de massive McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II-jagerflyene.
In May 1974, the Norwegian and American governments signed a secret Memorandum of Understanding on joint use of certain military air bases in Norway. The agreement was part of a newly initiated concept by the United States Air Force known as the Collocated Operating Base (COB) – a concept developed to ensure war bases for American aircraft in countries where permanently based aircraft were not allowed in peacetime. In a war scenario, 60 percent of American aircraft in Europe would be flown from the United States as part of war mobilization; COBs were therefore essential for American war strategy in Europe. At most, this network consisted of approximately seventy dedicated bases throughout Western Europe, eight located in Norway. Prolonged war operation from COBs meant that bases had to be prepared in advance, and so an important part of the agreement between the Norwegian and American governments was a separate technical and logistic arrangement for each designated COB airfield. This secondary agreement was to ensure provision of “Minimum Essential Facilities”, including parking areas and storage areas for fuel, ammunition, spare parts and ground-handling equipment for the American aircraft. When the agreement became publicly known in Norway in 1980, the peace movement and opponents of NATO argued that a diversion had been created symbolizing a new direction in Norwegian foreign and security policy. It is argued here that this was not the case. With Sola Air Base as an example, we show that, apart from the political framework, the activity itself related to the COB concept is little different from the activity at Norwegian Air Bases in earlier periods after the Second World War.