Mens den svenske politikken overfor
Norge under Gustav III og Carl Johan er nøye studert, har det vært
skrevet mindre om Gustav IV Adolf. Denne artikkelen undersøker politikken
overfor Norge i hans regjeringstid fra 1796 til 1809. Hovedargumentene
er at den var opportunistisk og pragmatisk, men ikke konstant, og
at den kan deles inn i to faser: først diplomatiske intriger i 1797–1801,
og deretter forsøk på å skape en folkelig stemning i Norge for en
forening. Dette siste var målet også i 1808 og derfor var ikke invasjonen
dette året ment som et regelrett erobringsforsøk. På mange måter
peker således Gustav IV Adolfs norgespolitikk frem mot den Carl
Johan førte frem mot 1814, og viser med det at Carl Johan var mindre
nyskapende enn han ofte blir fremstilt som.
Gustavus IV Adolph and Norway
While policies towards Norway during the regimes of King Gustavus
III (1772–92) and Crown Prince Regent Charles John (1810-14/18)
have been thoroughly examined by Scandinavian historians, less focus
has been devoted to policies during the reign of King Gustavus IV
Adolph (1796–09). Yet historians have tended to hold him as having
been more preoccupied with Norway than were his predecessor and
even Charles John. He also gained a reputation, especially internationally,
for being mentally unbalanced. This article offers an account of
the aims and strategies towards Norway throughout Gustavus IV Adolphs
reign, arguing that his policies were characterised by opportunism
and pragmatism, and usually conceived and advanced by his closest
circles. The policies towards Norway can be divided into two distinct
phases. The first, stretching from 1797 to 1801, comprised a number
of failed attempts at diplomatic plots. A favoured scheme was to
exchange Swedish Pomerania for Norway, preferably by way of Prussia,
while France and Russia were also approached. Nonetheless, Norway
was a secondary concern compared with Swedens quest for subsidies,
which were vital to her exhausted finances. The years 1801–03 marked
a shift in the strategies towards Norway as diplomatic plots were
abandoned in favour of attempts to drum up popular pro-Swedish sentiments within
Norway. Gustav Lagerbjelke, one of the Kings closest advisors, was
a key figure in this second phase, which also failed. The King then lost
interest in Norway and turned his attention to Germany instead. Not
until 1808 were his eyes again set on Norway, but only after Sweden
had most reluctantly been drawn into a war against Denmark-Norway,
France and Russia. Again key figures in the Kings closest circles, particularly
Gustav Mauritz Armfelt, were prime movers, and talked the reluctant
King into launching an invasion of Norway. Yet the invasion was
not one bent on military conquest, but was rather intended to show
the Norwegians how much they would actually benefit from Swedish
rule. Perhaps unsurprisingly, military occupation turned out to be
a futile way of winning their devotion, however. The war of 1808-09 turned
out to be a vast failure for which the King was blamed and consequently
deposed.