I middelalderens norske økonomiske system eksisterte det to betalingssystemer, varepenger og mynt. Disse systemene var integrert gjennom felles verdistandarder slik at de kunne brukes side om side og om hverandre. Ordningen ga stor fleksibilitet i verdivurderinger og betalingssituasjoner. I hvilken grad varepenger eller mynt var mer dominerende enn det andre, avhenger av faktorer som tid, rom og sosiale forhold. Samlet sett er det ikke tvil om at varepenger mange steder var mer utbredt enn mynt. Myntfunn viser at mynt ble kanalisert ut i store deler av kongeriket. Spørsmålet om mynt spilte en marginal eller viktig rolle i middelalderens økonomiske system, henger nøye sammen med i hvor stor grad mynt ble brukt, det vil si myntenes omløpshastighet. I denne artikkelen drøftes myntenes omløpshastighet i det norske middelaldersamfunnet. Verdien av myntomløpet kunne tidvis være større enn den samlete verdien av landskyld, korntiende, leidang, sakefall og peterspenning på årlig basis.
The velocity of circulation of Norwegian coins c. 1050 to c. 1320
Quantitative analysis suggests that the number of coins in circulation in medieval society must either have been enormous, to play any significant role, or their value was simply not great enough to be anything but insignificant. The assumption behind this calculation is that there was a one-to-one relationship between the number of coins issued and their value in circulation. In this article the velocity of circulation is brought into the equation.
As a basis for calculation of the velocity of coin circulation within medieval Norway the total value of coins is estimated at some 39,600 marks (13,200 marks burnt silver) in the 1280s, when coinage in Norway reached a peak in sophistication.
A simple model of the intensity of coin use in towns and rural society is presented as an illustration of the potential value of coins in circulation. In this model, each coin changed hands on average from three to fifteen times a year, which suggests that the total value of coin circulation might have been as much as 400,000 marks (133,000 marks burnt silver) on a yearly basis. Wear and tear of surviving coins found in a range of different archaeological contexts suggests that coins in this period were used many more than just a few times a year.
Etableringen av okkupasjonskontoen i Norges Bank er ett av de viktige, men lite
undersøkte spørsmål i norsk okkupasjonshistorie. Hvilke forhold og vurderinger lå til grunn for de beslutninger de sentrale norske aktørene Norges Bank, ledet av Nicolai Rygg, og Administrasjonsrådet, med finansminister Gunnar Jahn i spissen, traff i dette spørsmålet? I hvilken grad var de norske aktørene utsatt for direkte tysk press? En hovedkonklusjon er at Norges Bank 24. april 1940, under sterkt press fra finansminister Gunnar Jahn og Administrasjonsrådet, ga tyskerne en blankosjekk til sentralbankens midler med virkning for resten av okkupasjonen. Jahns og Administrasjonsrådets press på Norges Bank kan i liten grad forklares med et lignende direkte tysk press på dem.
The Norwegian central bank, the Administrative Council and the establishment of the occupation account in 1940
On 24 April 1940 the so-called occupation account on the balance sheet of Norges Bank, the Norwegian central bank, was established. Fifteen days after the German attack on Norway on 9 April 1940, and in the midst of the campaign, the Wehrmacht was given a blank cheque to finance the campaign and occupation by withdrawing against this account. The article analyses the background, while focusing on the central actors of Norges Bank, notably Governor Nikolai Rygg, and the Administrative Council, whose principal policy-maker in these matters was the Minister of Finance, Gunnar Jahn. One main conclusion is that Norges Bank, under strong pressure from Jahn and the Administrative Council, agreed to an unlimited change or cashing in of Reichskreditkassenscheine, which was a novel German financial innovation making occupied areas pay the conqueror. It was not transparent to Norwegian policy-makers at the time, however, the decision meeting significant opposition among Norges Banks elected representatives, who eventually gave in to the instruction by the Administrative Council and Ryggs unwavering attitude. The Germans did not put any direct pressure on Jahn and the Administrative Council in this matter beyond circumstantial power relations. One of the major explanations behind Jahns and the Administrative Councils pressure on Norges Bank was the need to create confidence in and acceptance of Reichskommissar Terboven, to whom the council had promised loyal cooperation in their first meeting on 23 April. This was necessary if the council was to achieve its aim of restoring employment and income in the occupied areas.