Koppeinokulasjon innebærer at smittestoff fra kopper risses inn i huden og fremkaller et vanligvis mildt tilfelle av koppesykdom med påfølgende immunitet. Metoden var i bruk i Europa på 1700-tallet, inntil den ble avløst av E. Jenners kukoppevaksine i 1796. Inokulasjon dreide seg ikke om å helbrede, men om å hindre sykdom, og reiste spørsmål av religiøs, etisk og medisinsk karakter. Metoden fikk relativt liten utbredelse i Norge, men var kjent over hele landet og kan ha blitt brukt som privat huskur. Publiserte tekster viser god kjennskap til den internasjonale debatten om inokulasjon i norsk offentlighet.
Ikke pålogget
{{session.user.firstName}} {{session.user.lastName}}
Du har tilgang til Idunn gjennom
, & {{sessionPartyGroup.name}}
Forord
(side 339-343)
Vitenskapelig publikasjon
(side 345-366)
av Anne Eriksen
SammendragEngelsk sammendragSmallpox inoculation in eighteenth-century Norway
Smallpox inoculation was practised in most European countries during the eighteenth century, its aim being not to cure, but to prevent, disease: Grafting variolous matter into the arms of a healthy person provoked a (normally) mild case of the disease, with subsequent immunity. As the first effective prophylactic against an epidemic disease, serious debate ensued: Could it be morally right to inflict healthy people with the seeds of a potentially fatal disease? In 1796, inoculation was replaced by Jenners vaccination method using harmless cowpox to produce immunity. In Norway, no extensive inoculation programmes were initiated, but the method appears to have been generally known. Medical texts and pamphlets propagating the method prove that the arguments and disputes from European debates on inoculation reached the country and were well known. Available source material also indicates that it was practised more widely than has so far been acknowledged. In the article, it is argued that lay persons with no medical training were well represented among the practitioners and that the new medical technique became a house remedy. The article presents Norwegian texts defending inoculation, beginning with the earliest one published in Trondheim in 1762, and follows actual practice from its beginnings in Trondheim to later cases in southern and eastern parts of the country.
Vitenskapelig publikasjon
(side 367-387)
av Hallgeir Elstad
SammendragEngelsk sammendragAlfred Eriksen, kjend som Karlsøypres-ten, var Det norske Arbeidarpartiets første parlamentariske leiar på Stortinget. Valet i 1903 representerte partiets gjennombrot i norsk politikk, då dei fire første representantane kunne ta sete i nasjonalforsamlinga – alle valde inn frå Troms. Eriksen var kjernen i dette politiske gjennombrotet. Denne artikkelen tek for seg eitt av framlegga Eriksen fremja på Stortinget. I 1904 gjekk han inn for å oppheve bispeembetet i Den norske kyrkja. Ordninga var gammaldags og hadde overlevd seg sjølv, meinte han. Dessutan ville ei oppheving medverke til å spare pengar for staten. I grunngjevinga av framlegget stod Eriksen fram både som politikar og liberalteolog. Framlegget møtte stor motstand blant dei kyrkjelege høyringsinstansane, men i fleire kyrkjelydar i Nord-Noreg fekk det støtte – i dei same områda der Arbeidarpartiet stod sterkast ved valet i 1903. Det er rimeleg å tolke dette resultatet i samanheng med det politiske gjennombrotet til partiet.
Alfred Eriksens Proposal for the Abolition of Episcopal Offices of the Church of Norway
Alfred Eriksen, known as the Karlsøy vicar, was the Labour Partys first parliamentary leader in Norway. His election in 1903 heralded the partys breakthrough in Norwegian politics, with the first four representatives taking their seats in Parliament (Stortinget), and all elected from Troms. Eriksen was at the core of this political breakthrough. The article discusses one of Eriksens proposals in Parliament. In 1904, he proposed to abolish the office of bishop in the Church of Norway, believing that both visitation and the episcopate were old institutions that had outlived their time and that to abolish them would save money for the state. In this, Eriksen proved himself both as a politician and as a liberal theologian. His proposal brought strong opposition from the ecclesiastical authorities, but in Northern Norway, where the Labour Party was strongest, several congregations supported it. It is reasonable to see this in context just with the partys political breakthrough.
Vitenskapelig publikasjon
(side 389-424)
av Pål Thonstad Sandvik
SammendragEngelsk sammendragLilleborgsaken var mellomkrigstidens mest intense konsesjonsstrid og førte til regjeringen Mowinckels fall i 1931. Spørsmålet var: Hvordan skulle norske myndigheter håndtere storkonsernet Unilevers forsøk på å erverve kontroll over norsk såpe- og margarinindustri? Valget sto mellom en pragmatisk regulering eller en kamplinje. Flere konfliktlinjer ble her vevet inn i hverandre. Det gjaldt forhold som norsk økonomisk selvstendighet, forholdet mellom stat og marked, regulering av ’storkapitalen’, vern av vitale eksportnæringer og beskyttelse av forbrukerinteressene. Vektleggingen av disse ulike hensynene gir derfor innblikk i nye dimensjoner ved mellomkrigstidens venstrestat og venstrekapitalisme.
The soap war 1930-31; Unilever, Lilleborg and Norwegian economic nationalism
The article explores interwar Norwegian economic nationalism, the increasing politicisation of the economy and the question of foreign ownership. This case study of the so-called «Lilleborgsaken» (the Lilleborg debacle) concerns Unilever’s attempt to gain control over the Norwegian company Lilleborg and thereby the domestic soap and margarine industry. The article explains the industrial background for Unilever’s expansion into Norway and the opposition it encountered. Foreign ownership was a very sensitive issue in interwar Norway, but vital Norwegian interest groups depended on sales to Unilever. The Anglo-Dutch multinational was almost the sole buyer of Norwegian whale oil and a large purchaser of seal oil, herring oil and other fish products. The Liberal -Mowinckel government therefore negotiated a compromise with Unilever and in the heated political atmosphere that ensued the government resigned in May 1931. Two months later, the next government, from the nationalistic Farmers’ party, grudgingly accepted the compromise. The article is an in-depth analysis of the political handling of Unilever and the Lilleborg debacle and gives important insight into the political economy of interwar Norway.
Vitenskapelig publikasjon
(side 425-446)
av Vidar Eng
SammendragEngelsk sammendragOslos biskop Berggrav skrev om Norge våren 1940: «Det er utrolig å ha opplevd den avgrunn som en stund besto mellom oss i den okkuperte del og våre landsmenn med regjeringen der nord. [...] Nordenfor befant de seg før klimaks, vi her nede etter klimaks. Det var som når en skypumpe passerer: foran og bak den blåser vindene i motsatte retninger.» Med bakgrunn i en masteroppgave om holdninger i Troms fra 9. april til 9. juni 1940, vurderes det hvorfor gode nordmenn hjalp tyskerne med å ruste opp flyplassene Fornebu og Værnes i april 1940, hvordan dette ble vurdert etter krigen, og om det fantes et handlingsalternativ.
Why did Norwegians work on the German-occupied airports in Oslo and -Trondheim in April 1940?
In April 1940, when Norway’s Nygaardsvold government and King Haakon were fleeing from pursuing German troops and planes, Norwegian authorities in Oslo and Trondheim cooperated with the occupation forces – King and government had been trying to organize resistance after the sudden invasion of the country on 9 April. Norwegian workers and building firms repaired and extended the airports near Oslo and Trondheim with the backing of local authorities. The Luftwaffe planes from these airports contributed to forcing Great Britain to evacuate south Norway around 1 May 1940. As a consequence, the Norwegian government also had to give up the whole of south Norway to the German forces. This defeat led to the Norway Debate in the British House of Commons that contributed to Churchill’s premiership. These airports also played a role in rescuing the German general Dietl from total defeat at the Battle of Narvik in north Norway. In my Master’s thesis (2006) I discussed how people in Troms County in North Norway responded to the government’s decision to resist the German attack in the period 9 April to 9 June 1940. My findings indicate that they mainly supported the war, although it may seem paradoxical that at the same time Nor-wegians in Oslo and Trondheim were cooperating with the Germans, the main explanation being that they were forced to do so. I discuss the extent to which this is true, and I give five additional explanations as to why the Norwegians in Oslo and Trondheim did what they did.
Bokmeldinger
(side 454-458)
av Ole Martin Rønning
(side 458-462)
av Øystein Rian
(side 463-469)
av Ruth Hemstad
(side 469-474)
av Alan Hutchinson
(side 479-482)
av Grethe Jacobsen
(side 491-494)
av Liv Helene Willumsen