Good exercise of ethical judgement is essential for ensuring responsible and useful research, whether one is evaluating or conducting it. The article discusses the nature of ethical judgement in research and argues that good judgement is not to be contrasted with the application of rules and principles, but on the contrary requires them. This feature also provides justification for the decisions reached.

The article asks whether the capacity for discretionary moral judgement is evenly distributed or whether some people have better discretionary moral judgement than others, and, if this is the case, how we can measure discretionary judgement. The exercise of discretionary judgement requires the capacity to identify the factors that are morally relevant and to understand why they are so. The required qualities are such that we can objectively judge whether people possess them, and those who possess such qualities have better discretionary judgement.

An increasing number of regulations are diminishing the space for discretionary judgement in research ethics. Following requirements thus set out and establishing strategies for avoiding the exercise of discretionary judgement can also be temptingly convenient for the researcher. This article highlights the fact that discretionary judgement is nonetheless an essential quality for researchers, enabling them to conduct research on humans in an appropriate manner. At the same time, the article emphasises that the exercise of discretionary judgement has important boundaries, and such judgement can sometimes be wrong.

The article discusses how to best exercise ethical judgement in research on especially vulnerable groups. How should ethical judgement be exercised, especially with a view to doing no harm and avoiding distress or offence? The text particularly emphasizes three elements in ethical judgement: empathy, obtaining knowledge of the context and possible outcomes of different choices, and assessment or weighing of the various interests against each other.

Communication of scientific uncertainty is an integral part of the responsibility of researchers. Yet such communication is challenging, not least due to the complexity of scientific uncertainty. Good communication demands more than mere rule-following; ethical judgements are required as well, which cannot always be encompassed by rules. Research ethical principles such as honesty, openness, and good consequences prove to be valuable as guidance when communicating the certainty and uncertainty that characterize scientific knowledge.

The research ethics guidelines published by the National Committee for Research Ethics in Science and Technology (NENT) recommend that traditional knowledge should be recognised in research. The article examines three areas where traditional knowledge raises challenges to society’s relationship with science, and where judgement plays a role in decisions: (1) demarcation of traditional knowledge and pseudoscience; (2) traditional knowledge and the use of resources; and (3) traditional knowledge and stakeholder engagement.

Although we have useful definitions of plagiarism, it is essential to have a few rules of good practice in order to help researchers avoid plagiarising. Even with such rules in place, breaches will occur and it may be difficult to determine whether someone has plagiarised and how serious the instance is. The article deals with examples of different degrees of seriousness in cases of plagiarism, and argues that a relevant academic background and solid ethical judgement are normally prerequisites for evaluating them.

Medical and health research projects require approval by a regional committee for medical and health research ethics before the research is initiated. The committees’ evaluation of particular research projects almost always involves the use of discretionary judgement, regarding both the application of law and the general research ethical evaluation. The article argues that exercise of discretion is justified in moral views accepted by the research community and society at large, and that discretionary judgement is a prerequisite to being able to evaluate similar projects on an equal basis.

How, and in what specific ways, can research institutions provide opportunities for their scientific employees to exercise well-qualified, ethical judgement in their research? The article discusses (1) the level of research ethics competence that it is reasonable for society at large to expect researchers to possess; (2) the corresponding framework for development and maintenance of researchers' ethical competence that research institutions should be expected to implement; and (3) the research ethics responsibility that can thereby be ascribed to the leadership of research institutions.