We have surveyed the attitudes of Norwegians toward ethical pension management that carries an opportunity cost. We study people’s attitudes towards their own pension fund, and their beliefs about other people’s attitudes. The focus is on how political party preference and associated values affect attitudes. We analyze the data with three alternative values systems: Inglehart’s Materialism and Post-materialism scale, Welzel’s Sacred-Secular and Obedient-Emancipative scales and Hellevik’s Traditional-Modern, Materialism--Idealism, and Political Left-Right scales. Our findings show that 40% of the respondents claim they would choose ethical investment, even though it implies a reduced pension. 28% would not choose ethical investment. It is unclear how those who say they do not know would end up, still the findings can be interpreted as a general positive attitude among people to ethical pension management. Attitudes depend on values, and Hellevik’s value system is a slightly better predictor than the two other value systems. The findings show that willingness to invest ethically increases with idealism, leftist position and education level, and sinks with income. However, the values are not related to people’s perception of other people’s attitudes.
The purpose of the study is to analyze whether investors see fair values of mark-to-market financial instruments as more value relevant than fair values of mark-to-model financial instruments. A sample of 98 European publicly listed banks is used to conduct the empirical study. Data on the amount of fair value financial instruments held by the banks is collected from annual reports for fiscal year 2009. We utilize disclosures mandated by the IFRS 7 fair value hierarchy which requires companies to categorize fair value instruments into three levels based on the objectivity of the inputs used in the valuation models. Additional data needed for the regression model is collected from the Thomson Datastream and Thomson Worldscope databases. Results of the empirical study support our hypothesis, i.e. that fair values based on market data are perceived by financial markets as more value relevant than fair values based on valuation models that utilize subjective inputs.
Firms increasingly engage in multiple strategic alliances simultaneously, often with partners from different industrial and national backgrounds. This results in portfolios of alliances that increasingly become larger and more complex. At the same time, firms realize different performance outcomes from their alliance portfolios; however, it is unclear why this is the case. Extant theories only provide partial insight into the underlying reasons for this inter-firm performance heterogeneity. This paper provides a critical assessment of traditional theorizing in alliance research, with a view to how they have informed motives for alliance portfolio formation but have also (partly) fallen short of explaining the performance heterogeneity among firms’ alliance portfolios.
The purpose of this conceptual paper is to contribute to the understanding of the coordination of knowledge flows – an important theme for organizational performance. In this article, we identify, describe and compare two perspectives on coordination of knowledge flows: the “knowledge-enabling” and the “control” perspective. The “knowledge-enabling” perspective presents a design view on coordination of knowledge flows where coordination is essentially facilitated by the mechanism of organizational structure. The “control” perspective provides a management accounting view of coordination of knowledge flows that are visualized and managed through accounting and reporting practices. The main contribution of this study is an analysis of the existing literature in the respective area and enhanced conceptual understanding of the coordination of knowledge flows of importance both for theory and practice.
A large portion of contemporary research on organizational change envisions change as the result of the intentions and actions of leaders. Leaders’ influence in leading organizational change, however, requires capacity to act freely and to exercise power. This article explores and examines the question of how and under what conditions leaders, as change agents, can balance or combine autonomy and power in leading change.